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BEYOND THE MARRIAGE TAX TRILEMMA
Daniel Hemel*

For decades, the well-known “marriage tax trilemma”
has played a central role in discussions of the tax treatment
of the family unit. The “trilemma” refers to the mathematical
impossibility of constructing a tax system that imposes the
same tax liability across all married couples with the same
income (couples neutrality), neither encourages nor penalizes
marriage (marriage neutrality), and taxes higher income
individuals at higher rates (progressivity).
Numerous
articles have proposed responses to the trilemma that choose
two of the legs over a third or that seek to split the difference
among the competing neutrality norms that the trilemma
casts as desirable. Most casebooks, meanwhile, use the
trilemma to introduce students to the policy debate over the
taxation of marriage and the household.
The overwhelming emphasis on the trilemma is
surprising once one recognizes that there is in fact no
trilemma at all: we need not choose among couples neutrality,
marriage neutrality, and progressivity because we can have
all three. The solution—which several scholars have noted,
but the tax policy debate has largely ignored—lies in a flat
tax rate combined with a refundable per-person tax credit (or
“demogrant”), which could be constructed so as to yield a
highly progressive average rate structure while maintaining
couples neutrality and marriage neutrality. Whatever the
merits of the flat tax plus demogrant as a policy matter, it
plays a useful role as a thought experiment: If we achieved
progressivity through a flat tax and a demogrant, such that
we could have couples neutrality and marriage neutrality
simultaneously, would we want to deviate from these
neutrality norms anyway? If so—if we would want to violate
the couples neutrality and marriage neutrality norms even if
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they were compatible with a progressive tax structure—then
the trilemma is not the central challenge in the taxation of
singles and couples.
This Essay examines the arguments for couples
neutrality and marriage neutrality, concluding that neither
norm is an appropriate objective for tax policy. Couples
neutrality sacrifices the potential efficiency gains from taxing
secondary earners at reduced rates. Marriage neutrality
relinquishes the distributive benefits of targeted transfers to
single parents. To be sure, deviations from couples neutrality
may lead to inefficient reallocations of labor within the
household, and a single parent bonus necessarily entails a
marriage penalty.
These tradeoffs—unlike the soluble
marriage tax trilemma—are the deep quandaries in the
taxation of marriage that scholars and policymakers must
confront.
The Essay concludes with implications for research,
policy, and pedagogy.
The analysis underscores the
importance of studying the welfare effects of “marginal
marriages”—the unions that modest tax penalties might
deter—rather than basing policy analysis on data drawn
from marriages that are distant from the margin. It also
casts a somewhat more favorable light on the marriage
penalties embedded in the earned income tax credit and the
head of household filing status under the current tax code.
Finally, it suggests that teachers of tax law should reorient
class materials and discussions away from a trilemma that
we know how to (but should not want to) solve and toward the
genuine dilemmas in the tax treatment of marriage.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental issue in the formulation of an income tax system
is the treatment of marital status. For the past several decades,
debates about the taxation of marriage in the United States have
revolved around the so-called “marriage tax trilemma.”1 The three
legs of the trilemma are (1) couples neutrality, (2) marriage
neutrality, and (3) progressivity.2 It is mathematically impossible to
devise a system that imposes the same tax liability across all married
couples with the same income (couples neutrality3), neither
1. Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV.
185, 185 (2014).
2. Id.
3. The terms “couples neutrality” and “couples equity” are used
interchangeably in the tax law literature. See, e.g., id. at 192; Victoria J.
Haneman, The Collision of Student Loan Debt and Joint Marital Taxation, 35
VA. TAX REV. 223, 239 (2016). The former term, though perhaps less descriptive,
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encourages nor penalizes marriage (marriage neutrality), and taxes
higher income individuals at higher rates (progressivity).4 An income
tax system can incorporate any two of these three features, but it
cannot have all three.5
Much of the legal scholarship on the tax treatment of marriage
since the early 1970s has focused on—and grappled with—this
trilemma. Boris Bittker, who was among the first tax law scholars to
identify the problem, concluded that “there can be no peace in this
area, only an uneasy truce.”6 Several authors have argued that the
trilemma should be solved by prioritizing marriage neutrality and
progressivity over couples neutrality.7 Lawrence Zelenak recently
suggested a system of couples neutrality and progressive rates that
would roughly equalize the maximum marriage penalty and marriage
bonus at each income level.8 Yair Listokin has proposed a progressive
rate structure that tries to strike a balance between couples
neutrality and marriage neutrality by deviating slightly from each,
based on the assumption that “violating two principles a little is
better than violating one principle a lot.”9 All of these authors
respond to the marriage tax trilemma either by choosing two of the
three principles to vindicate or by trying to find a workable
compromise among all three.
Not only does the trilemma idea shape scholarship on the tax
treatment of marriage, but it also suffuses the materials that we as
tax law professors use to teach our students. As Anne Alstott
observes, “most casebooks and law teachers use [the trilemma] to

is much more common (as of this writing, forty usages in the Westlaw “Law
Reviews & Journals” database versus six for “couples equity”). This follows the
crowd.
4. Listokin, supra note 1, at 192.
5. Id. at 195.
6. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1389, 1443 (1975). The trilemma was previously mentioned by Edwin
Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy under President
Nixon, in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee three years
earlier. See The Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where
Both Spouses Are Working: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
92nd Cong. 78 (1972) [hereinafter Cohen Testimony] (statement of Edwin S.
Cohen).
7. See, e.g., Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980); Anthony C. Infanti,
Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing in the
United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 610 (2010); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love,
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 65 (1993); Jeannette Anderson Winn & Marshall Winn, Till
Death Do We Split: Married Couples and Single Persons Under the Individual
Income Tax, 34 S.C. L. REV. 829, 869 (1983).
8. See Lawrence Zelenak, For Better or Worse: The Differing Income Tax
Treatments of Marriage at Different Income Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 783, 816
(2015).
9. Listokin, supra note 1, at 186.
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structure classes on the taxation of the family.”10 The most recent
edition of Alstott’s own coauthored casebook begins its section on the
taxation of the family with an extended discussion of the trilemma.11
The late Paul McDaniel and his coauthors introduce couples
neutrality, marriage neutrality, and progressivity as “competing and
conflicting policy objectives” in the taxation of marriage.12 Richard
Schmalbeck and Lawrence Zelenak use the trilemma to orient their
casebook’s discussion of the tax treatment of families, noting that
marriage non-neutrality is an “unfortunate” byproduct of “the basic
policy decisions to have (1) a progressive rate structure and (2) joint
returns for married taxpayers.”13 Virtually every other introductory
income tax casebook places the trilemma front and center in its
discussion of tax policy toward marriage.14 Perhaps most vividly,
hornbook authors Daniel Posin and Donald Tobin—after laying out
the trilemma and demonstrating its insolubility—conclude:
“Dispirited as we are by this conundrum, we are relegated to just
sitting in a corner and eating our Christmas pie.”15
The overwhelming scholarly and pedagogical focus on the
marriage tax trilemma is puzzling once one recognizes that, in fact,
there is no trilemma at all: we do not need to choose among couples
neutrality, marriage neutrality, and progressivity because we can
have all three. The straightforward solution lies in a flat tax rate
with a refundable per capita credit (or “demogrant,”) which would
achieve progressivity while also imposing equal taxes on all equal10. Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax,
and Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 698 (2013).
Alstott suggests that “[o]nce we recognize that marriage is no longer the
organizing institution for work and family life” we face the “new trilemma” in
constructing a tax code with progressive marginal rates that “assesses equal
taxes on households with equal earnings” and does not distort decisions regarding
household formation. Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
11. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, DEBORAH H. SCHENK & ANNE L. ALSTOTT, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 496–501 (8th ed. 2018).
12. PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1310 (6th ed. 2008).
13. RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
778–79 (2d ed. 2007).
14. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE,
STRUCTURE, AND POLICY—TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS 96 (4th ed. 2012); ALAN GUNN
& LARRY D. WARD, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 473
(6th ed. 2006) (listing progressivity, marriage neutrality, and couples neutrality
as the “[c]onflicting policy goals” in the taxation of marriage); PAUL R. MCDANIEL
ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1310 (6th ed. 2008)
(progressivity, marriage neutrality, and couples neutrality are the “[c]ompeting
and conflicting policy objectives” in the taxation of marriage). An important
exception is JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 395–96 (17th ed.
2017), which notes the possibility of using flat rates with a demogrant. See also
SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 13, at 779 (noting the possibility of a flat tax
plus demogrant but dismissing it as politically infeasible).
15. DANIEL Q. POSIN & DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 455 (6th ed. 2003).
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income couples and neither subsidizing nor penalizing marriage. The
solution, moreover, has existed in plain view for some time: Jane
Fraser, a scholar of industrial engineering and operations research,
demonstrated the point formally in a 1986 article in the journal
Management Science.16 A handful of tax law scholars have made the
same observation in the decades since—sometimes crediting Fraser,17
sometimes not.18
The primary objective of this Essay is not to demonstrate that a
flat tax plus a demogrant resolves the marriage tax trilemma. That
point—as noted—is one Fraser made with admirable clarity more
than three decades ago.19 Nor is my argument that we ought to adopt
a flat tax plus demogrant; others—including Joseph Bankman and
Thomas Griffith—have explored the virtues of this arrangement with
nuance and in depth.20 But whether or not it is a wise policy, a flat
tax plus a demogrant provides a useful thought experiment that
allows us to reevaluate the scholarly and pedagogical emphasis on the
marriage tax trilemma. If we were to achieve progressivity through
a flat tax plus a demogrant such that it would be possible to maintain
couples neutrality and marriage neutrality, would we want to deviate
from those principles? If yes—if we would want to depart from
couples neutrality and marriage neutrality even if both were
compatible with progressivity (as they are)—then the trilemma
cannot be the central challenge in the taxation of the family unit.
This Essay argues that neither couples neutrality nor marriage
neutrality ought to be a desideratum of tax policy. Put more starkly:
even if we can resolve the marriage tax trilemma (and we can), we
should not. We can make the tax system more efficient and more
equitable by imposing different tax burdens on couples with the same
combined income (thus violating couples neutrality), and we can
achieve meaningful distributional benefits by introducing modest
subsidies for single parents (thus violating marriage neutrality). The
central challenge in the taxation of marriage is not how to mediate
among the conflicting goals of couples neutrality, marriage
neutrality, and progressivity, not only because the third goal need not
conflict with the first two but also because the first two should not be
goals at all.

16. Jane M. Fraser, The Marriage Tax, 32 MGMT. SCI. 831, 839-40 (1986).
17. See Marcus Berliant & Paul Rothstein, Possibility, Impossibility, and
History in the Origins of the Marriage Tax, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 303, 303-04 (2003).
18. See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A
Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 75-76 (2000); see also Mitchell L. Engler
& Edward D. Stein, Not Too Separate or Unequal: Marriage Penalty Relief After
Obergefell, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1086 n.63 (2016) (citing Zelenak, supra).
19. Fraser, supra note 16, at 832.
20. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate
Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1955-67
(1987).
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Start with couples neutrality. A stylized fact of labor economics
is that secondary earners in dual income couples are more sensitive
to income tax rates than primary earners are.21 As a result,
policymakers can reduce the excess burden (i.e., “deadweight loss”) of
income taxation by applying lower tax rates to secondary earners
than to primary earners.22 Couples neutrality necessarily sacrifices
the potential efficiency gains from taxing secondary earners at lower
rates.23 Importantly, the efficiency gains from reducing the tax rate
on secondary earners must be balanced against the efficiency losses
that arise from tax-motivated reallocations of household labor
responsibilities when different members of a couple face different
rates.24 Several other authors have noted this tradeoff;25 this Essay
explains how the tradeoff can be resolved using a straightforward
mathematical formula based on the elasticity of taxable income for
primary and secondary earners.26 While there is still the formidable
empirical challenge of estimating those elasticities, the appropriate
conceptual framework is readily accessible.
Couples neutrality also appears unattractive from an equity
perspective. Equity considerations counsel in favor of allocating tax
burdens on the basis of ability to pay.27 Couples neutrality requires
that a couple in which one spouse earns $100,000 from full-time
employment and the other spouse earns zero must pay the same in
total tax as a couple in which both spouses work full time and earn
$50,000 each. All else equal, the first couple has a higher ability to
pay than the second because the non-earning spouse in the first
couple can provide services such as child care for which the second
couple likely must pay out of pocket. The principle of horizontal
equity instructs us to tax likes alike,28 but couples neutrality
necessarily leads us to tax unalikes alike and to tax likes unalike.

21. See, e.g., Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Taxes and the Labor Market
Participation of Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 88 J. PUB.
ECON. 1931, 1932–36 (2004); Robert K. Triest, The Effect of Income Taxation on
Labor Supply in the United States, 25 J. HUM. RESOURCES 491, 513 (1990).
22. Martin Feldstein & Daniel R. Feenberg, The Taxation of Two-Earner
Families, in THE EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD TAXATION 39, 40-41
(Martin Feldstein & James Poterba eds., 1996).
23. See John Piggott & John Whalley, The Tax Unit and Household
Production, 104 J. POL. ECON. 398, 415 (1996).
24. Id. at 399.
25. See, e.g., Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, Optimal Family Taxation and
Income Inequality, 25 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 1093, 1095 (2018); Michael J. Boskin
& Eytan Sheshinski, Optimal Tax Treatment of the Family: Married Couples, 20
J. PUB. ECON. 281, 282 (1983); Piggott & Whalley, supra note 23, at 415; Henry
E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 15,
198-99 (1998).
26. See Piggott & Whalley, supra note 23, at 399.
27. See, e.g., Triest, supra note 21, at 512-13.
28. Jonathan Barry Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage Penalties?,
30 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 n.3 (1996).
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Tax policy generally requires difficult tradeoffs between efficiency
and equity, but couples neutrality accomplishes neither.
The case against marriage neutrality, meanwhile, arises from the
observation that single status—and especially single parent status—
serves as a powerful indicator of ability to pay. Again, if we seek to
allocate tax burdens on the basis of ability to pay, this observation
would seem to suggest that single parents deserve a targeted tax
break. Interestingly, the argument for a single parent tax break
exposes deep tensions between utilitarian and egalitarian
justifications for progressive taxation.
And inevitably, the
implementation of a single parent tax break introduces a marriage
tax penalty. Critics of the marriage penalties generated by the
earned income tax credit and head of household filing status under
current law overlook the fact that these penalties are a logical
corollary of our choice to subsidize struggling single parents.29
In sum, the solubility of the classic trilemma does not answer the
question of how the tax system should treat marriage. Tax policy with
respect to marriage still involves difficult tradeoffs, though they are
different than the tradeoffs upon which the trilemma framework
focuses. In some cases, the fundamental difficulties are essentially
empirical; in other cases, the challenges are normative. While this
Essay offers a number of tentative policy recommendations regarding
the tax treatment of marriage, the more central claim is that we—as
scholars and as teachers—should redirect our attention from a largely
false trilemma and toward the deeper policy problems that the
taxation of marriage entails.
The Essay proceeds as follows: Part II introduces the marriage
tax trilemma and explains how federal tax law currently chooses to
resolve it. Part III shows how a flat tax with a demogrant would—at
least superficially—put the trilemma to rest. Part IV then asks
whether one leg of the trilemma, couples neutrality, is in fact a goal
29. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate:
Legislative Issues in Black and White, 16 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 287, 302
(1999); Zelenak, supra note 8, at 791, 816; Edward J. McCaffery, The Marriage
Penalty Was Never Fair, and Is Now Just Silly, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/14/improving-on-the-taxcodes-marriage-penalty/the-marriage-penalty-was-never-fair-and-is-now-justsilly. Alstott, whose deep and nuanced analysis of the tax treatment of marriage
has done more than anyone else’s to influence my own thinking, acknowledges
that marriage disincentives in the income tax and the earned income tax credit
are “[n]ot easily eradicated,” but Alstott still maintains that “[t]he marriage
penalty is undesirable”—a conclusion that I question in Part V. Anne L. Alstott,
Alleviating Marriage Penalties in the Income Tax and the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 66 TAX NOTES 1343, 1343 (1995). For a further (and rich) analysis of
marriage disincentives embedded in the EITC, see Anne L. Alstott, The Earned
Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 533, 559-64 (1995) (noting that “[t]he EITC, like other income-tested
transfer programs, creates unavoidable and difficult policy tradeoffs between
potential marriage disincentives and accurate targeting of benefits”).
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worth pursuing. Part V asks a similar question about the second leg
of the trilemma, marriage neutrality. The final Part concludes with
implications for research, policy, and pedagogy.
II. THE MARRIAGE TAX TRILEMMA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A.

The Trilemma in Theory

The marriage tax trilemma is ultimately a matter of math. Start
with four individuals: Addison, Blake, Casey, and Dana. Imagine
that Addison and Blake each earn $100,000, that Casey earns
$200,000, and that Dana earns $0. Consider a two-bracket income
tax schedule, with a 20% rate on the first $100,000 of income and a
40% rate on income over $100,000. This is a simple example of a
progressive marginal rate structure (i.e., a structure that imposes
higher marginal rates on higher-earning taxpayers). Table 1
illustrates the resulting distribution of income and tax burdens:
TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAX BURDENS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS—PROGRESSIVE

Income
Tax

Addison
$100,000
$20,000

Blake
$100,000
$20,000

Casey
$200,000
$60,000

Dana
$0
$0

Now imagine that Addison and Blake marry and that Casey
and Dana marry. Marriage neutrality requires that the tax paid by
Addison and Blake as a couple equal the total amount that each paid
previously. Otherwise, Addison and Blake would receive either a
marriage bonus or a marriage penalty. Likewise, marriage neutrality
requires that the tax paid by Casey and Dana as a couple equal the
total amount that each paid before. Table 2 illustrates the
distribution of income and tax burdens when the two-bracket
progressive income tax schedule described above is implemented in a
marriage-neutral manner:
TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAX BURDENS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL UNMARRIED AND MARRIED INDIVIDUALS—
PROGRESSIVE, MARRIAGE NEUTRAL

Income
Tax

Addison

Blake

$100,000
$20,000

$100,000
$20,000

Addison
& Blake
$200,000
$40,000

Casey

Dana

$200,000
$60,000

$0
$0

Casey &
Dana
$200,000
$60,000

While achieving marriage neutrality, the result in Table 2
violates couples neutrality, which requires that married couples with
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equal incomes pay equal amounts in taxes. The combined income of
Addison and Blake ($200,000) is equal to the combined income of
Casey and Dana ($200,000), but marriage neutrality means that
Addison and Blake pay less in taxes ($40,000) than Casey and Dana
do ($60,000).
Couples neutrality can be restored by setting the tax on the nowmarried Addison and Blake equal to the tax on the now-married
Casey and Dana. For example, we could raise the tax on Addison and
Blake to equal the tax on Casey and Dana, as illustrated in Table 3:
TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAX BURDENS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL UNMARRIED AND MARRIED INDIVIDUALS—
PROGRESSIVE, MARRIAGE PENALTY FOR EQUAL-EARNING COUPLE

Income
Tax

Addison

Blake

Addison
& Blake

Casey

Dana

Casey &
Dana

$100,000
$20,000

$100,000
$20,000

$200,000
$60,000

$200,000
$60,000

$0
$0

$200,000
$60,000

Now, the married Addison and Blake pay the same in taxes as
the married Casey and Dana ($60,000), but Addison and Blake pay
more in combined taxes when they are married ($60,000) than they
did when they were single ($40,000). Thus, Addison and Blake face a
marriage penalty.
Alternatively, we could restore couples neutrality by lowering the
tax on the now-married Casey and Dana to equal the tax on the nowmarried Addison and Blake, as illustrated in Table 4:
TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAX BURDENS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL UNMARRIED AND MARRIED INDIVIDUALS—
PROGRESSIVE, MARRIAGE BONUS FOR UNEQUAL-EARNING COUPLE

Income
Tax

Addison

Blake

$100,000
$20,000

$100,000
$20,000

Addison
& Blake
$200,000
$40,000

Casey

Dana

$200,000
$60,000

$0
$0

Casey &
Dana
$200,000
$40,000

Now, the married Casey and Dana pay the same in taxes as the
married Addison and Blake ($40,000), but the combined tax paid by
Casey and Dana is less when they are married ($40,000) than when
they were single ($60,000). Thus, Casey and Dana reap a marriage
bonus.
Our problem arises because we began with the premise of
progressivity: if Casey’s income is twice Addison’s, then Casey must
pay more than twice what Addison does in taxes. If we abandon
progressivity as a premise, then couples neutrality and marriage
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neutrality can both be achieved. Imagine that we set a flat tax rate
equal to 25% of income, as illustrated in Table 5:
TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAX BURDENS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL UNMARRIED AND MARRIED INDIVIDUALS—FLAT RATE
(25%)

Income
Tax

Addison

Blake

$100,000
$25,000

$100,000
$25,000

Addison
& Blake
$200,000
$50,000

Casey

Dana

$200,000
$50,000

$0
$0

Casey &
Dana
$200,000
$50,000

We have achieved the goals of couples neutrality and marriage
neutrality, but at the price of progressivity. Thus, as these Tables
illustrate, it would seem that as long as we cling to the principle of
progressivity, couples neutrality and marriage neutrality are not
simultaneously maintainable.
Consistent with this logic, President Nixon’s Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Edwin Cohen, told the House Ways
and Means Committee in 1972 that “[n]o algebraic equation, no
matter how sophisticated,” can reconcile couples neutrality and
marriage neutrality with progressive taxation.30 “All that we can
hope for,” the Assistant Secretary said, “is a reasonable
compromise.”31 Similarly, the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation stated in a 1980 report that “[a]ny system of taxing married
couples requires making a choice among three different ideas of tax
equity”: that “the tax system should be ‘marriage neutral’”; that
“couples with the same income should pay the same amount of tax”;
and finally, that “as income rises, the tax burden should rise as a
percentage of income.”32 “Unhappily,” the staff report concluded,
“these three concepts of equity are mutually inconsistent.”33 Judge
Henry Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—
in rejecting a claim that marriage penalties in the federal income tax
code violated the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee—likewise
said that “it is simply impossible to design a progressive tax regime
in which all married couples of equal aggregate income are taxed
equally and in which an individual’s tax liability is unaffected by
changes in marital status.”34 Quoting Cohen, Judge Friendly noted
that “[b]oth ends of a seesaw cannot be up at the same time.”35

30. Cohen Testimony, supra note 6, at 79.
31. Id.
32. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF
MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 26 (1980).
33. Id.
34. Druker v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982).
35. Id. at 50 (quoting Cohen Testimony, supra note 6).
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B.

The Trilemma Across Time
The ends of the seesaw have swung up at different times
throughout U.S. history. From the passage of the first modern income
tax in 1913 until 1930, Congress prioritized marriage neutrality over
couples neutrality.36 Then in 1930, the Supreme Court held in Poe v.
Seaborn37 that each spouse in a community property state should be
taxed on 50 percent of the couple’s community income.38 As a result,
couples in community property states (at the time, Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington) generally reaped a marriage bonus, while marriage
neutrality prevailed in the rest of the country.39 The Revenue Act of
1948 extended the benefit of income splitting to couples in all states;
thus, couples neutrality with a marriage bonus became the
nationwide norm.40 Since then, couples neutrality has remained close
to a constant (with a notable exception in the 1980s discussed below),
but marriage neutrality has not. Couples with a primary earner who
makes substantially more than a secondary earner have generally
reaped a marriage bonus, while couples in which each member makes
approximately the same amount have faced sometimes-substantial
marriage penalties.41
During the 2016 presidential campaign, candidate Donald
Trump vowed to “eliminate the marriage penalty” once and for all.42
The tax bill that he signed into law in December 201743 fell well short
of that promise. While some news reports in the initial aftermath of
the bill’s passage suggested that Congress and President Trump had
eliminated marriage penalties for all except the highest income
earners,44 the new law leaves in place—and in some cases
36. See Edward G. Fox, Do Taxes Affect Marriage? Lessons from History 19–
23 (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch., N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-15, 2017).
37. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
38. Id. at 118.
39. See Fox, supra note 36, at 18–19.
40. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (1948);
see also Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family– The Revenue Act of
1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1103–16 (1948).
41. See John Brozovsky & A.J. Cataldo, II, A Historical Analysis of the
“Marriage Tax Penalty”, 21 ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 163, 166 (1994).
42. Donald J. Trump for President, Trump: Tax Reform That Will Make
America Great Again, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/trump-tax-reform.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2019).
43. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
44. See Michael Durkheimer, Under the GOP Tax Bill, Not Being Married
Could
Cost
You,
FORBES
(Dec.
17,
2017,
3:08
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldurkheimer/2017/12/17/under-the-gop-taxbill-not-being-married-could-cost-you (“The potential for a ‘marriage
penalty’ . . . would be preserved, in small part, for a few potential couples earning
very high incomes (over $300,000 each) . . . .”); Louis Jacobs, Marriage Penalty
Mostly Eliminated, But Not Entirely, POLITIFACT (Dec. 21, 2017, 3:16 PM),
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exacerbates—substantial marriage penalties for dual income couples
that earn much less than the highest earners.45
Table 6 is a representation of the marriage bonuses (positive) and
penalties (negative) that couples at different income levels face under
the new law. The left side shows the effect of marriage on federal
income tax liability for a couple with no children; the right side shows
the effect of marriage on federal income tax liability for a couple with
two children (one each). For two individuals earning the same
amount (the 50/50 Split), the marriage penalty can be quite
substantial—especially when each member of the couple has a child.
For couples in which one member is the sole income earner (the 100/0
Split), marriage results in a generous tax bonus at most points along
the income distribution.
TABLE 6. MARRIAGE BONUSES AND PENALTIES FOR TAX YEAR 2018*
No Children
2 Children (1 Each)
Bonus
Bonus
Bonus
Bonus
(Penalty)
(Penalty)
(Penalty)
(Penalty)
50/50 Split
100/0 Split
50/50 Split
100/0 Split
$20,000
–$735
+$800
–$709
+$3583
$50,000
+$1
+$1631
–$1339
–$39
$100,000
+$1
+$6671
–$1603
+$5849
$200,000
+$1
+$11,031
–$5643
+$9719
$500,000**
–$4849
+$31,761
–$7631
+$30,369
*Author’s calculations, factoring in statutory tax rates, standard deduction,
earned income tax credit, child tax credit for child under 17, and additional
Medicare tax. Assumes that a single individual with one child will file as a
head of household and that married couples will file jointly.
**For couple with combined income of $500,000, assumes itemized deductions;
5% state income tax rate; $20,000 per person in mortgage interest and
charitable contributions.
Combined
Income

It is worth pausing to emphasize that these marriage bonuses
and penalties are annual. If you are reading this and you are a
member of a dual-earner married couple with a combined income of
$200,000 per year and with, say, a 2 year-old and a newborn, consider
that the expected net present value of the tax savings from getting
divorced and cohabitating with your spouse from now until when your

https://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/promises/trumpometer/promise/1427/eliminate-marriage-penalty (“Under
the new tax brackets, the marriage penalty only phases in with the secondhighest tax bracket . . . which is for earners between $200,000 and $500,000
(individual) and $400,000 and $600,000 (married couples).”).
45. See infra Table 6.
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2 year-old goes off to college is on the order of $70,000.46 Of course,
the rate tables may (and likely will) change between now and then,
but they could change in either direction (i.e., the marriage penalty
could be lower, but it also may be higher). This is not a brief for
divorce and cohabitation; it is merely to point out that marriage
penalties remain real and substantial.
Four features of the tax code account for most of the marriage
penalties observed. The first is the earned income tax credit (“EITC”).
In tax year 2018, the credit begins to phase out at $18,660 for single
parents and at $24,350 for married parents.47 Thus, low-income
single parents whose earned income falls below the phaseout amount
may vault into the phaseout range when they wed (and, in some cases,
may lose the credit entirely as a result of marriage).48 The December
2017 tax law left the EITC untouched, so the preexisting EITC
marriage penalty persists.49
Second, the December 2017 tax law retains the head of household
filing status.50 Single parents who live with children under age 19
will generally qualify as heads of household.51 The new standard
deduction for heads of household is $18,000, while the standard
deduction for joint filers is $24,000.52 Thus, if two heads of household
who claim the standard deduction decide to marry, their combined
taxable income rises by $12,000 (i.e., the sum of their standard
deductions falls from $36,000 to $24,000). Moreover, the structure of
the bottom three income tax brackets is particularly favorable to
heads of household relative to single filers and married couples.53
Single parents who marry sacrifice the benefit of the preferential
head of household rate structure.
Third, the December 2017 tax law imposes a $10,000 cap on state
and local tax (“SALT”) deductions for individual taxpayers.54 The
same $10,000 cap applies to single filers, heads of household, and
married couples filing jointly.55 Thus, two unmarried individuals who
46. The net present value of a fifteen-year term annuity with an annual
payment of $5,643 per year and a three percent interest rate is $69,386.74.
47. Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B.
48. Rev. Rul. 2018-06, 2018-10 I.R.B. Moreover, the maximum credit for a
parent with one child ($3,461) is less than half the maximum credit for parents
with two children ($5,716), so if two credit-eligible single parents, each with one
child, decide to marry, their combined credit will fall. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18.
49. See Allen J. Rubenfield & Ganesh M. Pandit, The Status of the “Marriage
Penalty”: An Update from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, CPA J. (Feb. 2019),
https://www.cpajournal.com/2019/02/04/the-status-of-the-marriage-penalty-anupdate-from-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/.
50. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2018).
51. See id. §152.
52. See id. § 63(c)(7).
53. See id. § 1(j)(2)(B).
54. See id. § 164(b)(6)(B).
55. The cap is $5000 for a married individual filing a separate return. See
id.
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itemize their deductions and whose SALT payments exceed the cap
will see their taxable income rise by $10,000 if they wed. The
structure of the SALT cap alone imposes a marriage penalty of up to
$3700 on higher income individuals—with the brunt of the burden
borne by individuals in blue states that tend to have higher state and
local taxes.56
Finally, several of the taxes imposed by the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) have marriage penalties baked into them. The additional
hospital insurance tax of 0.9% applies to wages above $200,000 for
single filers and heads of household but sets in at $250,000 for joint
filers.57 That provision alone adds a marriage penalty of up to $1350
for high-income couples. The ACA’s 3.8% net investment income tax
takes effect at the same thresholds, yielding a marriage penalty of up
to $5700 for couples with substantial income from interest, dividends,
capital gains, and similar sources.58 The December 2017 tax law did
not repeal these provisions of the ACA.59 Nor did it alter the ACA’s
premium assistance credit,60 which can add a marriage penalty of
more than $1000 for two-earner couples slightly above the poverty
line.61
As the previous paragraphs indicate, “blame” for marriage
penalties lies at both parties’ feet. Congressional Republicans and a
Republican President exacerbated the marriage penalty for low- to
middle-income single parents as part of the December 2017 tax law;62
Congressional Democrats and a Democratic President exacerbated
the marriage penalty for very high-income, equal-earner couples as
56. On the disparate geographic impact and political economy of the $10,000
SALT cap, see Daniel Hemel, The Death and Life of the State and Local Tax
Deduction, 72 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
57. See I.R.C. § 3101(b)(2).
58. See id. § 1411 (a)–(b).
59. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
60. See I.R.C. § 36B.
61. For a characteristically clear illustration of the potential marriage
penalty embedded in the premium assistance credit, see Zelenak, supra note 8,
at 802-04.
62. For single parents who claim the standard deduction, the 2017 tax law
expanded the marriage penalty for equal-income single parents by rolling
personal exemptions into a larger marriage-dependent standard deduction.
Compare Publication 501 (2017), Exemptions, Standard Deduction, and Filing
Information, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p501-2017.pdf, with Publication 501 (2018), Dependents, Standard Deduction, and
Filing
Information,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p501 (last updated Jan. 7, 2019). Under prior
law, a couple’s combined “zero bracket” shrunk by $6000 when two heads of
household married.
See Publication 501 (2017), Exemptions, Standard
Deductions,
and
Filing
Information,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p501--2017.pdf. Under current law, the $6000
figure jumps to $12000.
Publication 501 (2018), Dependents, Standard
Deduction,
and
Filing
Information,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p501 (last updated Jan. 7, 2019).
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part of the 2012 Affordable Care Act.63 And as I argue in Part V,
“blame” is not obviously the right word to describe the appropriate
response to the realization that the tax code penalizes (some)
marriages. Marriage penalties may be a feature, not a bug, of our tax
laws. The goal of the discussion here is simply to show that—
notwithstanding news reports regarding the near-elimination of
marriage penalties—federal tax law still penalizes many potential
marriages.
To be sure, millions of couples stand to reduce their tax bills via
marriage—sometimes quite substantially.64 Couples with disparate
incomes benefit the most from knot-tying (at least as far as tax
liability is concerned); couples with equal incomes often lose out.65
However, it is clear that Congress’ resolution to the marriage tax
trilemma is the opposite of the solution that many academic
commentators have recommended:66 rather than prioritizing
marriage neutrality over couples neutrality, Congress has hewn
closely to couples neutrality while letting marriage neutrality fall by
the wayside.
III. HACKING THE MARRIAGE TAX TRILEMMA
It does not have to be this way. As noted in the introduction,
marriage non-neutrality is not a necessary byproduct of our choice to
maintain couples neutrality within a progressive tax system. The
trilemma, it turns out, is not as intractable as it initially seems.
The solution lies in a linear income tax with a demogrant. To see
how that might work, return to our two hypothetical couples: Addison
and Blake, and Casey and Dana. Again, Addison and Blake each earn
$100,000, while Casey earns $200,000 and Dana earns $0. In Tables
1 through 4, we sought to achieve progressivity through a two-bracket
rate structure. Imagine instead that we impose a 35% flat tax rate
and a $10,000 per person refundable tax credit, or demogrant. Table
7 illustrates the resulting distribution of income and tax burdens
when Addison, Blake, Casey, and Dana earn the same as before and
are unmarried:

63. The ACA also led to larger marriage penalties for many lower-income
couples claiming premium assistance subsidies for the purchase of health
insurance on the individual market. See J. Sebastian Leguizamon & Susane
Leguizamon, Health Insurance Subsidies and the Expansion of an Implicit
Marriage Penalty: A Regional Comparison of Various Means-Tested Programmes,
25 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 130 (2018).
64. Laura Saunders, Everything You Need to Know About the New Tax
Law—Before the End of the Year, WALL ST. J.: YOUR MONEY (Nov. 2, 2018, 5:30
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-newtax-lawbefore-the-end-of-the-year-1541151030.
65. See supra Table 6.
66. See sources cited supra note 7.
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TABLE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAX BURDENS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS—FLAT TAX (35%) WITH
DEMOGRANT ($10,000)

Income
Tax
Effective Tax
Rate

Addison
$100,000
$25,000
25%

Blake
$100,000
$25,000
25%

Casey
$200,000
$60,000
30%

Dana
$0
–$10,000
—

The tax system still is progressive in terms of effective rate: the
higher your income, the higher your effective rate. The net revenue
raised by the government ($100,000) also is the same in both systems.
But now consider what happens when Addison and Blake marry and
when Casey and Dana marry:
TABLE 8. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAX BURDENS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL UNMARRIED AND MARRIED INDIVIDUALS— FLAT TAX
(35%) WITH DEMOGRANT ($10,000)

Income
Tax
Effective
Tax Rate

Addison

Blake

$100,000
$25,000
25%

$100,000
$25,000
25%

Addison
& Blake
$200,000
$50,000
25%

Casey

Dana

$200,000
$60,000
30%

$0
–$10,000
—

Casey &
Dana
$200,000
$50,000
25%

As Table 8 illustrates, the combined amount paid by Addison and
Blake is $50,000 regardless of whether they are married. So too for
Casey and Dana. Marriage neutrality and couples neutrality have
been restored.
Only the most credulous of readers would stop at this point and
conclude that the marriage tax trilemma has been solved once and for
all. There are several potential objections to replacing the current
graduated rate schedule with a flat tax plus a demogrant. Three
merit particular attention.
First, one might wonder whether a flat tax plus a demogrant can
actually achieve the same degree of progressivity as a graduated rate
structure. One way to approach that question is to imagine a
revenue-neutral reform that substituted such a structure for the
existing tax system. To illustrate: the Treasury Department’s Office
of Tax Analysis estimates that in 2019, total U.S. family cash income
will be $16.424 trillion and the IRS will collect $3.020 trillion in
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taxes.67 Before accounting for possible changes in labor supply (which
conceivably could bias the calculation in either direction), Congress
could more or less match that total by imposing a 27 percent flat tax
with a $4000 demogrant, or a 29 percent flat tax with a $5000
demogrant, or a 31 percent flat tax with a $6000 demogrant.68
How would the distribution of tax burdens under those systems
compare to the status quo? Table 9 shows the total amount of tax
paid (in billions of dollars) and the share of the tax burden borne (in
percentage terms) by each income decile under current law and three
alternative systems. The three alternatives all satisfy the revenue
neutrality constraint (i.e., all raise net revenue of at least the $3.020
trillion, the amount that the Office of Tax Analysis expects will be
raised in 201969). Each of the alternatives is more generous to
taxpayers in the bottom four deciles and somewhat less generous to
taxpayers in the middle and upper-middle class (50th through 90th
percentile). Taxpayers in the top 0.1 percent of the income
distribution fare slightly better under all of these alternatives—but
not all that much. The key point is that the distribution of tax
burdens under a flat tax with a demogrant need not stray all that
dramatically from the distribution of tax burdens under current law.

67. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DISTRIBUTION
TABLE 2019 001—DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES, CASH INCOME, AND FEDERAL TAXES
UNDER 2019 CURRENT LAW (2018).
68. The calculation is concededly crude. The U.S. Census Bureau projects a
population of approximately 328.2 million as of January 1, 2019. See Press
Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Projects U.S. and World
Populations
on
New
Year’s
Day
(Feb.
1,
2019),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/new-yearspopulation.html. 27% x $16.424 trillion — ($4,000 x 328.2 million) » $3.12
trillion. That is, a 27% tax rate on family cash income of $16.424 trillion,
combined with a per-person demogrant of $4,000 paid to 328.2 million people,
would leave $3.12 trillion. Likewise, 29% x $16.424 trillion — ($5,000 x 328.2
million) » $3.12 trillion, and 31% x $16.424 trillion — ($6,000 x 328.2 million) »
$3.12 trillion.
69. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 67.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438075

HEMEL_FINALAUTHORREAD_DH_SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

118

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

8/15/19 11:19 PM

[Vol. 54

TABLE 9. TAX LIABILITY (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND PERCENT
DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDEN) BY INCOME GROUP—CURRENT LAW
VS. FLAT TAX PLUS DEMOGRANT
Percentile

Current Law

27% Flat
29% Flat
31% Flat
Rate
Rate
Rate
+ $4k
+ $5k
+ $6k
Demogrant
Demogrant
Demogrant
($B)
(%)
($B)
(%)
($B)
(%)
($B)
(%)
0-10
1
0.0%
–63
–2.1%
–83
–2.7% –103 –3.4%
10-20
–14
–0.5%
–48
–1.6%
–74
–2.4% –100 –3.3%
20-30
–3
–0.1%
–17
–0.6%
–43
–1.4%
–68
–2.2%
30-40
27
0.9%
26
0.9%
5
0.1%
–17
–0.6%
40-50
69
2.3%
80
2.6%
63
2.0%
45
1.5%
50-60
121
4.0%
151
4.9%
138
4.5%
125
4.1%
60-70
188
6.2%
238
7.7%
231
7.5%
223
7.3%
70-80
296
9.8%
355
11.5%
356
11.6%
356
11.7%
80-90
484
16.0%
542
17.6%
556
18.1%
570
18.6%
90-100
1849 61.2% 1826 59.3% 1934 63.1% 2042 66.8%
Total
3020 100.0% 3077 100.0% 3066 100.0% 3056 100.0%
90-95
389
12.9%
466
15.1%
496
16.2%
527
17.2%
95-99
560
18.5%
641
20.8%
685
22.3%
730
23.9%
99-99.9
440
14.6%
430
14.0%
461
15.0%
492
16.1%
Top 0.1
460
15.2%
399
13.0%
428
14.0%
458
15.0%
Dollar amounts in billions. Percentiles reflect rankings by adjusted family cash
income. Based on author’s calculations and data from U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Office of Tax Analysis, Distribution Table 2019 001—Distribution of Families,
Cash Income, and Federal Taxes Under 2019 Current Law (Apr. 18, 2018).70

There are, of course, an infinite set of options for setting the flat
tax rate and the demogrant size, and each item in that set generates
different distributive results. Not all distributions of tax burdens that
are possible under a graduated rate structure can be replicated
through a flat tax plus a demogrant, and we cannot match the current
distribution exactly. There is, however, nothing magical about the
existing distribution of tax burdens: the status quo is not necessarily
preferable to an alternative that would be more generous to very lowincome households and somewhat less generous to the middle- and
upper-middle households. Moreover, taxation is not the only lever
that affects redistribution.71 If we are seriously concerned that a flat
tax plus demogrant does too much to shrink the middle- and upper70. See id.
71. See, e.g., Roland Bénabou, Tax and Education Policy in a HeterogeneousAgent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?,
70 ECONOMETRICA 481, 482 (2002) (demonstrating economic redistribution
achieved through both income tax and education finance policy).
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middle class’s share of the pie, then we could consider non-tax offsets
(e.g., changes to educational funding formulas that redound to the
benefit of suburban school districts).
A second concern with a flat tax plus a demogrant is that it
complicates efforts to impose a very high marginal tax rate on very
high-income individuals and households. In the 2016 presidential
campaign, Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders proposed a top
marginal rate of 50.2% on incomes above $2 million and 54.2% on
incomes above $10 million.72 Economists Thomas Piketty, Emanuel
Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva have prominently argued that the
social welfare-maximizing tax rate on very high earners in the United
States likely exceeds 80%.73 At some points in U.S. history, the top
marginal rate has exceeded 90%.74
The case for a very high tax rate on very high incomes does not
require a graduated rate schedule at lower echelons. A two-bracket
structure with a second bracket that applies only to the top 1 percent
of earners would achieve couples neutrality and marriage neutrality
for the overwhelming majority of taxpayers. We could solve the
trilemma for all but the very highest income Americans (and their
potential partners) while also maintaining a highly progressive
average-rate structure.75 The desire to tax the rich at quasiconfiscatory rates—something we do not do today—is not the
trilemma’s primary source.
Third, some readers may object to the idea—implicit in the flat
tax plus demogrant proposal—of making substantial cash transfers
to low-income individuals and households. Elsewhere, Miranda Perry
Fleischer and I have argued that the concerns regarding cash
transfers are largely unwarranted.76
For those who remain
unconvinced by the case for cash transfers, a possible solution is to
provide any refund that exceeds tax liability in restricted form. For
example, refunds could be distributed through debit cards that—like
electronic benefit transfer cards issued to recipients of Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families in many states—cannot be used for
alcohol, tobacco products, gambling, lottery tickets, guns, tattoos,
72. Alan Cole & Scott Greenberg, Details and Analysis of Senator Bernie
Sanders’s
Tax
Plan,
TAX
FOUND.
(Jan.
28,
2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/details-and-analysis-senator-bernie-sanders-s-taxplan.
73. See Thomas Piketty et. al., Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A
Tale of Three Elasticities, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 230, 268 (2014).
74. The top marginal income tax rate was 94 percent in 1944 and 1945, and
above 90 percent again from 1951 to 1963. See Historical Highest Marginal
Income
Tax
Rates,
TAX
POLICY
CTR.
(Jan.
18,
2019),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-incometax-rates.
75. See supra Table 9 (showing the consistency that would stay in place for
the lower bracket).
76. See Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, The Architecture of a Basic
Income, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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body piercings, jewelry, or adult entertainment.77 An even more
restrictive approach might limit the use of refunds to a small set of
expenses (e.g., food, rent, transportation, medical care, and
education). To be clear, none of this is to suggest that cash transfers
should be limited in this way. The narrower point is that any unease
regarding unrestricted cash transfers to low-income individuals and
households does not necessarily put us back into the trilemma.
Importantly, the argument here is emphatically not that we
ought to switch to a flat tax plus a demogrant. The point of the flat
tax plus demogrant discussion is that we could switch to such a
system and make the marriage tax trilemma go away. The
distributional results here are presented not as precise estimates but
instead used to motivate a thought experiment—to convince the
reader that a flat tax plus a demogrant is a feasible way of achieving
progressivity. But even if we did overcome the marriage tax trilemma
through a flat tax plus a demogrant, we would likely want to
reintroduce features that violate the principles of couples neutrality
and marriage neutrality. If that is the case, then the trilemma is not
the central problem in the taxation of marriage.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST COUPLES NEUTRALITY
The argument in this Part and the one that follows is that even
if we can achieve both couples neutrality and marriage neutrality, we
probably do not want to. This Part focuses on couples neutrality; the
next Part takes up marriage neutrality. The goal is, by the end, to
convince the reader that given a choice between couples neutrality
and marriage neutrality, the most sensible answer is likely: neither.
Couples neutrality—the idea that two married couples with the
same income should pay the same amount in tax, regardless of the
division of income among spouses—is sometimes characterized as an
instantiation of what tax scholars call “horizontal equity”: the idea
that tax liabilities should be similar across units with similar abilities
to pay.78 Setting aside the question of whether the couple (rather
than the individual) should be the relevant unit for horizontal equity
analysis, the notion that couples with the same income are similarly
situated for ability-to-pay purposes is questionable. Consider again
the example from Parts II and III in which Addison and Blake each
earn $100,000, Casey earns $200,000, and Dana earns $0. If Addison
and Blake marry and Casey and Dana marry, couples neutrality
would require that both couples pay the same amount in tax. Yet it
is difficult to see why any substantive conception of horizontal equity
77. See Restrictions on Use of Public Assistance Electronic Benefit Transfer
(EBT) Cards, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 8, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/ebt-electronic-benefit-transfercard-restrictions-for-public-assistance.aspx.
78. See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage
Penalties?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 n.3 (1996).
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would require that result. Addison and Blake do not have the same
combined ability to pay as Casey and Dana, because Dana—who does
not work outside the home—can perform a range of household tasks
that Addison and Blake must hire someone else to do (e.g., care for
children while Addison and Blake are working in the market
economy) or that Addison and Blake must fit into the few hours of the
week in which they are not working outside the home (cooking,
cleaning, laundry, and so on). Moreover, Addison and Blake likely
both incur nondeductible employment-related expenses (e.g.,
commuting costs, clothing suitable for work, etc.)79 that only one
member of the Casey-Dana unit must pay.
While couples neutrality is questionable from a horizontal equity
perspective, there is a superficially strong efficiency argument for
taxing married couples as a unit in any system with multiple tax rates
on labor income. To see why, imagine again a two-bracket progressive
income tax schedule with a 20% rate on the first $100,000 of income
and a 40% rate on income over $100,000. If Casey and Dana are
treated as different tax units, then Casey—with $200,000 of income—
will be in the 40 percent bracket, and Dana—with no income—will be
in the 20 percent bracket. Now imagine that Casey and Dana are
deciding which one should prepare dinner and which one should work
an extra hour in the market economy. Assume that dinner
preparation takes an hour and that Casey and Dana are equally
skilled chefs. Assume as well that Casey’s hourly wage is $100, that
Dana could earn an hourly wage of $80 as a freelancer, and that in
both cases the wage is equal to the marginal product of labor.
The socially optimal outcome would be for Casey to work in the
market economy and for Dana to cook: that option would produce
$100 plus a home-cooked dinner; while the alternative (Casey cooking
and Dana working) would generate $80 plus a home-cooked dinner.
But that is not the privately optimal outcome for Casey and Dana,
because Casey’s after-tax income (taking into account Casey’s 40%
marginal rate) would be $60 while Dana’s after-tax income (taking
into account Dana’s 20% rate) would be $64. Taxing Casey and Dana
at different rates results in an inefficient allocation of household and
market labor within the marital unit (i.e., Casey cooks and Dana
works when the reverse arrangement would be more efficient).80
Efficiency arguments do not, however, point unambiguously
toward equalizing the tax rate among members of the same marital
unit. The reason why is that the price elasticity of labor supply is
generally thought to be higher for the secondary earner than for the

79. Deducting
Business
Expenses,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/deductingbusiness-expenses (last updated June 3, 2019).
80. See generally Piggott & Whalley, supra note 23, at 415 (discussing how
taxing individuals rather than households is more efficient).
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primary earner in a couple whose members have different incomes.81
Note that while some authors refer to the difference in the price
elasticity of labor supply across genders,82 recent evidence suggests
that primary earner versus secondary earner status may be a more
accurate proxy for price elasticity than gender.83 In other words, to
predict how responsive Casey and Dana will be to tax changes,
knowing their genders likely matters less than knowing who earns
more.
This insight points toward a potentially efficiency-enhancing
policy intervention. If we start out with a flat rate of 30 percent on
all income and then ever-so-slightly raise the rate on Casey (the
primary earner) and reduce the rate on Dana (the secondary earner),
Casey’s taxable income will likely fall by less than Dana’s taxable
income rises. Since the efficiency gain or loss from an income tax
change is, approximately the change in taxable income times the tax
rate,84 setting Casey’s tax rate equal to Dana’s tax rate effectively
amounts to leaving money on the table. We could instead raise the
tax rate on Casey, reduce the tax rate on Dana, and thereby raise the
same amount of money with lower overall deadweight loss.85 Or,
instead of seeking to hold revenue constant, we could seek to hold
deadweight loss constant—in which case raising the tax rate on Casey
and reducing the rate on Dana would allow us to raise more money to
spend on the provision of public goods.
Thus, we encounter a genuine tradeoff in the tax treatment of
married couples. On the one hand, if the marginal tax rate on
primary earners is higher than the marginal tax rate on secondary
earners, married couples will inefficiently reallocate household labor
81. Id. at 410.
82. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 180 (2d ed. 1999)
(stating that “the variance between male and female labor supply elasticities” is
“striking”).
83. See, e.g., Emily Fitzgibbons Shafer, Wives’ Relative Wages, Husbands’
Paid Work Hours, and Wives’ Labor-Force Exit, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 250, 250
(2011) (finding that the probability of a wife exiting the labor force is significantly
lower if she earns more than her husband); see also Alex Baldwin, Michael
Allgrunn & Raymond Ring, Does the Male-Female Partition Still Apply to
Household Labor Supply?, 8 INT’L J. OF APPLIED ECON. 46, 50 (2011) (primary
versus secondary earner status appears to be more predictive of labor supply than
gender); Robert McClelland et al., Labor Force Participation Elasticities of
Women and Secondary Earners Within Married Couples, 17–18 (Cong. Budget
Office,
Working
Paper
2014-06,
Sept.
2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-20132014/workingpaper/49433-laborforce.pdf (finding generally low elasticities on the
extensive margin—i.e., the choice between working and not working—but
somewhat higher elasticities for secondary earners than for women).
84. See Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the
Income Tax, 81 REV. ECON. & STATS. 674, 674–75 (1999).
85. For a formal derivation of this result, see Patricia F. Apps & Ray Rees,
Individual Versus Joint Taxation in Models with Household Production, 107 J.
POL. ECON. 393, 395–400 (1999).
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responsibilities from the secondary earner to the primary earner. On
the other hand, if the marginal tax rate on primary earners is equal
to the marginal tax rate on secondary earners, then we forgo an
opportunity to reduce the deadweight loss of the income tax. The
result is a dilemma rather than a trilemma, and it is a dilemma that
a flat tax plus a demogrant does not allow us to escape.86
Fortunately, the dilemma is not intractable—at least at a
conceptual level. We can arrive at a first-cut solution by applying the
“elasticity of taxable income” approach proposed by economist Martin
Feldstein in the late 1990s and refined by Raj Chetty a decade later.87
That approach yields a formula for determining the optimal
difference in rates between primary and secondary earners.88
The elasticity of taxable income approach posits that the
deadweight loss from an increase in the income tax rate is
approximately equal to the decrease in taxable income resulting from
the change multiplied by the tax rate.89 For a tax cut, it is the reverse:
the reduction in deadweight loss is equal to the increase in taxable
income times the tax rate.90 To see why, return to the previous
scenario involving Casey and Dana, where Casey’s wage is $100 and
Casey’s tax rate is 40%, and Dana’s wage is $80 and Dana’s tax rate
is 20%. Casey allocates time between market labor and household
production until Casey is indifferent between (a) working one hour
outside the home, earning $100, and paying a $40 tax, for after-tax
income of $60, and (b) engaging in household labor that results in
home production of $60. Society, however, is not indifferent between
these two options, because when Casey works outside the home,
Casey generates an extra $40 of tax revenue, which can be used to
finance public goods or tax rebates. So when Casey reallocates one
hour from market labor to household production, Casey is roughly as
well off as before, but society loses out on $40 of tax revenue.
The same is true for Dana. Dana allocates time between market
labor and household production until Dana is indifferent between (a)
working one hour outside the home, earning $80, and paying a $16
86. I am certainly not the first to suggest a lower rate on secondary earners
than on primary earners. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the
Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV.
983, 1035–46 (1993). McCaffery’s pathbreaking work on the taxation of the
family does not consider the distortions to household labor allocation decisions
that would arise if different spouses of the same couple faced different marginal
rates. See generally id.
87. See Feldstein, supra note 82, at 674; Raj Chetty, Is the Taxable Income
Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion
and Avoidance, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 31, 32 (2009). For an application of
this framework in a different context, see David Weisbach, Daniel Hemel &
Jennifer Nou, The Marginal Revenue Rule in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 160 TAX
NOTES 1507, 1508 (2018).
88. Chetty, supra note 85, at 31.
89. Id. at 32.
90. Id.
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tax, and (b) engaging in household labor that results in home
production of $64. When a small reduction in the tax rate on
secondary earners causes Dana to reallocate one hour from household
labor to market labor, Dana is roughly as well off as before, but society
benefits from the $16 in additional taxes that Dana pays.
Congress, meanwhile, can set a tax rate (t) on all income and then
add a discount (d) for secondary earners. Thus, the income of primary
earner spouses and unmarried individuals is taxed at a rate of t while
the income of secondary-earner spouses is taxed at a rate of t – d.
Assume that Congress faces a fixed revenue constraint, and that the
revenue constraint can be satisfied by setting t equal to 30% and d
equal to 0. For any value of d > 0, there is a corresponding value of
t > 30 percent such that revenue remains constant. The options for t
and d that satisfy this revenue constraint compose the revenue
frontier, as illustrated (albeit crudely) by Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. CONGRESS’ REVENUE FRONTIER

0.40

t 0.30

0.20

d

After Congress sets t and d, primary and secondary earners must
decide how to allocate their time between market labor and household
production. Let wP be the wage of a primary earner and wS be the
wage of a secondary earner. The primary earner works outside the
home until the after-tax return from allocating an additional hour to
market labor ((1 – t)wP) is equal to the opportunity cost of forgoing
one hour of household production. Likewise, the secondary earner
works outside the home until ((1 – (t – d))wS) is equal to the value of
an additional hour of household production.
Now imagine that we move ever so slightly to the right along the
revenue frontier in Figure 1, increasing the overall tax rate t and
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reducing the tax rate on secondary earners (t – d) while holding total
revenue constant. Primary earners will respond by reallocating time
from market labor to household production (and perhaps to leisure as
well). Let ∆LP be the change in the number of hours that primary
earners devote to market labor as a result of the tax change. The
elasticity of taxable income approach teaches that the change in
deadweight loss due to primary earners reducing their labor output
is equal to the change in taxable income times the tax rate (here:
∆LP*wP*t). Intuitively, since the primary earner was previously
indifferent between an additional hour of market labor and an
additional hour devoted to household production, the reallocation of a
small quantity of labor from the market economy to the household
sector has no fundamental effect on the welfare of that taxpayer, but
it does reduce the resources available to society by ∆LP*wP*t.91
Secondary earners, meanwhile, will respond by reallocating time
from household labor (and, perhaps, from leisure) to market labor.
The elasticity of taxable income approach instructs that the increase
in labor output from secondary earners reduces the total deadweight
loss of the income tax by ∆LD*wD*(t – d), which will be positive.
If the price elasticity of labor supply is indeed higher for
secondary earners than for primary earners, it is likely that
secondary earners will increase their hours worked by more than
primary earners reduce their labor output—at least at first. But
because the deadweight loss of a tax is proportional to the square of
the rate, the efficiency loss from increasing t as we move rightward
along the revenue frontier will ultimately catch up to the efficiency
gain from lowering d. The optimal position on the revenue frontier is
the point at which the increase in deadweight loss from increasing t
(due to a reduction in the taxable income of primary earners) is equal
to the reduction in deadweight loss from increasing d (due to an
increase in the taxable income of secondary earners). Algebraically,
the challenge is to set t and d such that ∆LP*wP*t = ∆LD*wD*(t – d).
One attraction of this approach is that it obviates the need to look
inside the black box of the household—i.e., to directly estimate the
value of each spouse’s household production or leisure. We can
assume (for now) that spouses allocate their time such that the value
of an additional hour of household labor equals the after-tax income
from an additional hour of market labor—if these values were not
equal, the spouses would not be allocating their time optimally and
could make themselves better off by reallocating. Note as well that
in estimating deadweight loss, we need not distinguish between time
that taxpayers reallocate from market labor to household production
and time that taxpayers reallocate from market labor to leisure: the
deadweight loss is the same. That is because taxpayers will seek to
91. More precisely, the effect on the total quantity of resources available to
society is ∆LP*wP*t; the reduction in the resources available to society is –
∆LP*wP*t, because ∆LP*wP*t is negative.
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allocate their time such that the after-tax wage from an additional
hour of work in the market economy equals the value of an additional
hour of household production or the value of an additional hour of
leisure.92
This prescription—set the wedge between the tax rate on
secondary earners and primary earners so as to occupy the point on
the revenue frontier at which the increase in deadweight loss from
marginally raising the rate on primary earners equals the reduction
in deadweight loss from marginally lowering the rate on secondary
earners—offers a first-cut solution to the dilemma laid out above, but
only a first cut. Aside from the empirical challenges in estimating the
elasticity of taxable income for primary and secondary earners, there
are at least four other factors to consider in determining whether—
and by how much—to deviate from couples neutrality.
First, a reduced rate for secondary earners will inevitably result
in violations of the marriage neutrality principle. If all individuals
other than secondary earners (i.e., primary earners in married
couples plus unmarried persons) pay tax at the higher rate and
secondary earners pay tax at a reduced rate, the result will be a
marriage bonus whenever both members of a couple have paying
jobs.93 If primary earners in married couples face a higher tax rate
92. Three somewhat more technical notes are in order. First, the analysis
does not depend on whether changes to labor supply occur along the intensive
margin (i.e., how many hours a taxpayer works) or along the extensive margin
(i.e., whether a taxpayer works at all). If taxpayers only make a binary choice
between participating in the non-household labor force and not participating,
then the marginal taxpayer will be one who is indifferent between those two
options. A change in tax rates that causes a taxpayer to rejoin (or leave) the nonhousehold labor force has no first-order effect on that taxpayer’s welfare but
increases (or reduces) social welfare by the change in taxable income.
Second, the elasticity of taxable income framework does not require us to
separately estimate the cross-wage elasticity of primary and secondary earners.
In other words, it may be that as the after-tax income of one spouse rises, the
other spouse becomes less likely to work. We can capture this effect by observing
the change in the taxable income of primary and secondary earners after a change
in t and d—we need not know, for instance, how much of the increase in secondary
earners’ taxable income is due to their tax rate now being lower and how much is
due to their spouse’s tax rate now being higher.
Third, the change in taxable income resulting from an adjustment to t
and d is not the same as the revenue effect from an adjustment to t and d. The
reason why is that changes in revenue from taxpayers who do not alter their
behavior should be considered transfers—rather than net benefits or net costs—
for purposes of cost-benefit analysis. For example, if t rises from 40 percent to
40.1 percent and a primary earner continues to work 2000 hours a year at $100
per hour, the primary earner will be $200 worse off (0.1 percent x 2000 x $100),
but the government will have an additional $200 to spend on public goods or tax
rebates. The costs and the benefits balance out. Only changes in revenue that
result from behavioral changes should factor directly into cost-benefit analysis.
See Weisbach, Hemel & Nou, supra note 85, at 1508.
93. See generally Listokin, supra note 1, at 187 (noting that “[m]arriage
neutrality requires that each couple pay the same amount of income tax they paid
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than single workers while secondary earners in married couples face
a lower rate, the likely result will be marriage penalties for couples
in which one member earns a disproportionate share of household
income. How we feel about these results will depend on our views
toward marriage neutrality more broadly, and I will defer further
discussion of that subject to Part V. The key point for present
purposes is that this violation of marriage neutrality is not an
inevitable consequence of our commitment to couples neutrality;
rather, it is a direct result of our decision to deviate from couples
neutrality.
Second, and relatedly, a reduced rate for secondary earners will
have distributional effects. It will result in redistribution from
couples with lopsided income splits (like Casey and Dana) toward
couples with close-to-even income splits (like Addison and Blake).94
That outcome may be one that most readers regard as acceptable or
even desirable. As noted above, the nontaxation of household labor
means that couples in which one spouse works mostly or exclusively
inside the home are undertaxed relative to their ability to pay.95
Higher taxes on those couples relative to couples with near-equal
incomes can be thought of as an approximate solution to the
inefficiencies and inequities that arise from our inability to include
household labor within the tax base.
Third, a reduced rate for secondary earners will likely lead to an
increase in female participation in the (non-household) labor force,
since more than 70 percent of secondary earners in dual-income
heterosexual marriages are female.96 This is potentially a salubrious
result.97 A growing body of research suggests that an increase in the
when single,” thus a reduced rate for secondary earners would result in the
secondary earner paying a lesser amount of income tax because he or she is
married).
94. Assume that if two spouses have exactly the same income, as was the
case with Addison and Blake, they could take advantage of the reduced rate for
one of their incomes. Otherwise, either Addison or Blake would have a very
strong incentive to earn $1 less so as to qualify for the reduced rate.
95. See Piggott & Whalley, supra note 23, at 415 (“We suggest that household
production also needs to be taken into account, since not distorting input
decisions by family members in household production instead suggests taxing on
a household rather than individual basis.”).
96. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES: FAMILIES—TABLE
F-22: MARRIED-COUPLE FAMILIES WITH WIVES’ EARNINGS GREATER THAN
HUSBANDS’ EARNINGS: 1981 TO 2017 (2017), https://www2.census.gov/programssurveys/cps/tables/time-series/historical-income-families/f22.xls.
97. Some might disagree on the ground that there are positive welfare effects
from parents spending more time with their children, and thus there are negative
externalities from secondary earners shifting from the household sector to the
market economy. To this concern there are at least two responses. First, insofar
as parents appropriately account for their children’s welfare in their own
decisions, then the elasticity of taxable income framework fully captures these
effects. For an insightful discussion of related issues, see Theodore P. Seto, Does
the Income Tax Cause Parents to Spend Too Much Time with Their Children?:
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number of women occupying corporate leadership roles may improve
firm performance98 and reduce corporate fraud,99 among other
benefits. Positive externalities resulting from female labor force
participation may justify an even larger wedge between the tax rates
on primary and secondary earners than the elasticity-of-taxableincome analysis would imply. However, note that the positive
externalities attributable to female labor force participation tend to
be associated with women in leadership positions, who are more likely
than other married women to be primary earners.100 A reduced tax
rate on women rather than on secondary earners may be a better way
to encourage positive externalities from female labor force
participation, but such a policy would raise serious (and potentially
insurmountable) constitutional concerns.101
Fourth, while a wedge between the tax rate on primary and
secondary earners may lead to men (who again tend to be primary
earners in heterosexual couples) allocating more time to household
labor, tax is a very blunt tool with which to pursue this outcome. It
is also possible that even if a reduced rate on secondary earners
induces married women to work longer hours outside the home, they
will continue to perform the same “second shift” of household labor
and childcare as before.102 Put differently, while tax changes can
affect a household’s allocation of time between market labor and
household production/leisure, it is much harder to know whether tax
changes produce effects on the allocation of responsibilities within the
household. Potentially, as secondary earners devote more time to
market labor, their bargaining power within the household will rise
(e.g., because their exit options become more attractive if they have a
greater ability to support themselves outside the marriage). In that
case, a larger wedge between the tax rate on secondary earners and
everyone else may encourage a more equitable distribution of
household responsibilities, but any such prediction would be highly
speculative.

Rethinking Mirrlees, 36 VA. TAX. REV. 55 (2017). Second, if we believe that
parents spend too little time with their children, then the optimal policy might be
an increase in the tax rate on all parents, perhaps combined with a larger
demogrant for children. Id. at 61.
98. See, e.g., Marcus Noland et al., Is Gender Diversity Profitable? Evidence
from a Global Survey 3 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper 16-3, 2016),
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wp16-3.pdf.
99. See Darrell J. Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Twenty-First-Century
Corporate Crime: Female Involvement and the Gender Gap in Enron-Era
Corporate Frauds, 78 AM. J. SOC. 448, 453 (2013).
100. Noland et al., supra note 96, at 3 (noting that the “largest gains” in
performance are for female executives).
101. For further discussion, see Daniel J. Hemel, Should Tax Rates Decline
with Age?, 120 YALE L.J. 1885, 1893 (2011).
102. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT:
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 3 (1989).
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Lest the proposal for a reduced rate on secondary earners be
dismissed as politically infeasible, note that the idea is actually one
that Congress once adopted—and not too long ago. The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 allowed dual income spouses to deduct up
to 5% of the first $30,000 of income earned by the lower earning
spouse, increasing to 10% in 1983.103 While the provision did not
survive the 1986 tax overhaul, which eliminated a large number of
perceived tax expenditures with the goal of reducing top marginal
rates,104 its passage suggests that couples neutrality is not in fact a
third rail of American tax politics. Deviation from the couples
neutrality norm may be politically plausible as well as normatively
desirable.
In sum, differences in labor supply elasticities between primary
and secondary earners in dual-income marriages indicate that the
optimal tax treatment of married couples entails a reduced rate on
the secondary earner’s income. That prescription directly contradicts
the principle of couples neutrality and inevitably leads to violations
of marriage neutrality as well. Determining the optimal wedge
between the tax rate on secondary earners and the tax rate on
everyone else still raises the difficult empirical challenge of
estimating the point where the reduction in deadweight loss from
secondary earners working more hours equals the increase in
deadweight loss from everyone else working less. But this empirical
challenge is quite different from the tradeoffs the marriage tax
trilemma focuses on. In this respect, the trilemma functions as a
distraction rather than as a framework for understanding the optimal
taxation of marriage.
V. IN PRAISE OF MARRIAGE PENALTIES
The previous Part focused on the arguments for and against
couples neutrality. It acknowledged that deviations from couples
neutrality may lead to inefficient reallocations of household labor, but
argued the welfare gains from taxing secondary earners at a lower
rate likely outweigh the conceded costs. This Part shifts focus to the
second leg of the trilemma: marriage neutrality. I suggest that
marriage neutrality may have, if anything, even less to recommend
itself than couples neutrality does.

103. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat.
172, 187 (repealed 1986); see also Pamela B. Gann, Earned Income Deduction:
Congress’s 1981 Response to the Marriage Penalty Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 468,
476 (1983) (explaining that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 allowed twoworker married couples to deduct five percent of the lower spouse’s income, and
that number increased to ten percent in 1983).
104. See generally JEFFREY BIRNBAUM & ALAN MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI
GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM
(1987) (discussing the emphasis on marginal rate reductions in the runup to the
1986 overhaul).
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The idea that the tax system should be “neutral” with respect to
marriage is widespread: intelligent commentators often accept it as
an article of faith.105 It is also something of a puzzle. We do not
demand other areas of law be “marriage neutral.”106 Marriage, after
all, is a legal construct: to say that the law should be neutral with
respect to marriage is a bit like saying that the law should be neutral
with respect to fee simple or the corporate form.107 The law
advantages marriage in ways too numerous to list exhaustively. The
federal Family and Medical Leave Act applies to the care of a spouse
but not an unmarried partner;108 tenancy by the entirety allows
spouses, but not other committed couples, to hold property in a form
that makes it difficult for creditors to obtain;109 Social Security’s old
age, survivors, and disability insurance program offers benefits to the
spouses of retired and deceased workers but not their lifelong
companions;110 and so on. What is it about tax law that makes it
inappropriate for tax to “distort” marriage decisions when virtually
every other area of law does so already?
Perhaps the strongest argument that one can make in favor of a
marriage-neutral tax code is that, as Alstott suggests, “marriage is no
longer a good proxy for the activities that a welfarist income tax
should aim to notice.”111 Marriage is not—nor was it ever—perfectly
predictive of cohabitation and the material advantages that arise
when adults in a household can pool resources and responsibilities.112
But marriage most certainly is a proxy for cohabitation. According to
2017 Census Bureau data, approximately 88% of adults age 18 and
over who share a household with a partner are married to that
person.113 Of parents with children under age 18 who live with a

105. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 290
(13th ed. 2015) (“One would prefer that the tax law be ‘neutral’ in its effect on the
decision to marry or not marry . . . .”); Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing the
Components of Income: A U.S. Perspective, 86 GEO. L.J. 123, 132 (1997) (“[T]wo
individuals who marry should pay neither more tax nor less tax than they paid,
on the same aggregate income, before marriage.”).
106. See Note, The Effects of Marriage on the Rules of the Criminal Law, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 73, 73 (1961).
107. Cf. Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1777–82
(2005) (exploring the analogy between marriage and the corporate form).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2012).
109. See John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the
Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 46 (1997).
110. See Alstott, supra note 10, at 752–56 (explaining that the systems
“[a]ward benefits based on formal marriage . . . .”).
111. Id. at 738.
112. See id. at 696.
113. See Table AD-3—Living Arrangements of Adults 18 and Over, 1967 to
Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2017), https://www2.census.gov/programssurveys/demo/tables/families/time-series/adults/ad3.xlsx.
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partner, 91% are married to that person.114 If cohabitation with a
partner is the characteristic that we are trying to identify, marriage—
a measure with a sensitivity of roughly 90%—fares admirably well.115
Tax law, moreover, relies on imperfect proxies all the time. We
generally think that tax burdens should be allocated on the basis of
ability to pay,116 but we lack a perfect way to measure ability to pay.
Income is a flawed measure. Two individuals with the same income
may have very different abilities to pay if, for example, one of the two
succeeded to a family member’s rent-controlled apartment while the
other leases an equivalent unit at market rate. An individual who
cares for an ailing child or spouse may have a much lower ability to
pay than another individual with the same income and superficially
identical household characteristics. Tax law necessarily draws
distinctions that balance accuracy against efficiency—perfect
accuracy is rarely possible and even more rarely desirable in light of
information costs.117
Marriage, I have argued, is indeed a good proxy for cohabitation,
but why is cohabitation an activity that the income tax should aim to
notice? One answer is that we think tax burdens should be allocated
on the basis of ability to pay, and that single parent status is a
reasonably accurate proxy for (lower) ability to pay. A single parent
cannot rely on a spouse for household labor or childcare while the
single parent earns income in the market economy. A single parent
also lacks the implicit wage insurance that results from having a
second potential income earner in the household.118 For similar
reasons, a single parent often lacks the same ability as a married
parent to exit the workforce temporarily and devote time to education
or vocational training that could enhance future earnings. Moreover,
114. See Table AD-2—Parents with Coresident Children, by Living
Arrangement and Age of Child: 2007 to Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2017),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tables/families/timeseries/adults/ad2.xls.
115. To be sure, if we frame the question as what percentage of unmarried
adults with children are single parents, then we get a lower number (68 percent).
See id. The discrepancy is a reflection of the familiar difference between
sensitivities and specificities (or true positive rates and true negative rates). See
Neha Shitut, Sensitivity v. Specificity in Logistic Regression, ANALYTICS
TRAINING,
https://analyticstraining.com/sensitivity-vs-specificity-in-logisticregression/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2018) (discussing the difference between and
importance of sensitivity and specificity). Yet even if one takes 68 percent rather
than 91 percent to be the relevant figure, marital status remains highly
predictive of whether a parent is or is not raising her or his children with a
partner in the same home.
116. See Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 867, 867–68 (2002).
117. See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 61, 77–78 (1998); see also David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,
Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1627–30
(1999).
118. See Jacob Goldin & Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of Household:
Rethinking the Taxation of Single Parents, 71 TAX L. REV. 367, 381 (2018).
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price per unit generally decreases with quantity, so feeding two
mouths (a single parent and a child) is more expensive per person
than feeding three mouths (two parents and a child).119 Thus, single
parents cannot take advantage of scale economies in household
consumption to the same extent as married couples with children.
Possibly for these reasons, the United States currently supports
single parents in a variety of ways. As noted above, single parents
are generally eligible for head of household filing status, which results
in a larger standard deduction and a more favorable rate schedule,
and may draw larger benefits from the EITC.120 In addition, non-tax
transfer programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families entail
implicit single parent bonuses.121
These features of the tax code and the welfare state are often
criticized—from the left and the right—on the ground that they
penalize marriage, particularly among low income parents.122 And
they indeed yield that consequence.
A marriage penalty for
households with children is a necessary corollary to a single parent
bonus. If we offer larger credits (or demogrants) to single parents or
tax them at lower rates, then we will be encouraging taxpayers to
have children outside of marriage and penalizing parents for their
decision to marry. This is effectively what we already do through the
EITC and head of household filing status.123
Recognizing the inevitable tradeoff between a single parent
bonus and a marriage penalty does not imply that a single parent
bonus is a bad idea. Rather, it suggests that the distributional
benefits of a single parent bonus should be evaluated in light of the
marriage effects. Determining what weight to assign to each side of
this balance is surprisingly complicated.
119. See Brad Tuttle, The Economic Argument for Having More Kids, TIME
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/01/20/the-economic-argument-forhaving-more-kids/.
120. See Goldin & Liscow, supra note 116, at 373–75; see also Bruce D. Meyer,
The Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Recent Reforms, 24 TAX POL’Y &
ECON. 153, 156 (2010).
121. See Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerle, The Hefty Penalty on Marriage
Facing Many Households with Children, 15 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 157, 159 (2005).
122. See, e.g., ROBERT GREENSTEIN, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT:
BOOSTING EMPLOYMENT, AIDING THE POOR 6 (2005) (arguing for a reduction in the
EITC marriage penalty); Zelenak, supra note 8, at 816 (criticizing the “[s]evere
marriage penalties” for low-income couples and suggesting that they should be
replaced with marriage bonuses); David T. Ellwood & Isabel V. Sawhill, Fixing
the Marriage Penalty in the EITC, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 20, 2000),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/fixing-the-marriage-penalty-in-the-eitc
(exploring options for reducing the EITC marriage penalty); Edwin J. Feulner,
Purging the Marriage Penalty, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/commentary/purging-themarriage-penalty (arguing that marriage penalties embedded in the EITC are
“unwise” and “perverse”).
123. Feulner, supra note 120, at 2; Zelenak, supra note 8, at 796.
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Start with the distributional benefits of a single parent bonus.
The argument briefly articulated at the outset of this Part was that
single parents merit a bonus to reflect their reduced ability to pay.
That conclusion is less closely tied to utilitarian premises than it
might initially seem.
Utilitarian approaches to taxation and
redistribution generally focus on the diminishing marginal utility of
income (or consumption)124: To a person below the poverty line, $100
of income matters more than it does to, say, Jeff Bezos.
Correspondingly, paying $100 of taxes “hurts” less for Bezos than for
the low-income individual. Redistributing $100 from Bezos to the
low-income individual raises total utility, or welfare, insofar as the
utility that the low-income individual derives from having an
additional $100 exceeds the utility that Bezos loses from paying an
additional $100. At the same time, the distributional benefits of
transferring resources from Bezos to the low-income individual must
be balanced against the excess burden (i.e., deadweight loss) of a tax
that rises with income. Optimal tax models posit that income tax
rates (and demogrants) should be set so that the marginal
distributional benefit of moving to a more progressive system equals
the marginal excess burden.125
One might think that this utilitarian model would translate quite
cleanly to the single parent context: the single parent bonus and
marriage penalty should be set such that, at the margin, the
distributional benefit of transferring resources to single parents
equals the cost of distorting marriage choices. But matters are in fact
much more nuanced. Even though single parents likely have a lower
ability to pay than married couples, the marginal utility of income is
not necessarily higher for a single parent than for a married couple.
So, the utilitarian case for redistributing on the basis of single parent
status is less straightforward than one might think.
To see why, imagine that we implement a flat tax with a
demogrant and that we set the rate and the demogrant such that
distributional benefit and deadweight loss are equal at the margin.
Addison and Blake each earn $100,000 and are married with one
child, while Shirley earns $100,000 and is single with one child.
Shirley then argues that demogrants should be adjusted to transfer
more to single parents, who face the added burden (not yet accounted
for in the tax and demogrant) of raising a child alone. Shirley’s ability
to pay, in other words, is impaired in ways for which the tax structure
has not yet accounted. Addison and Blake respond that while
Shirley’s ability to pay is compromised by Shirley’s single parent
status, the marginal utility of income is not necessarily higher for
Shirley and her child than for Addison, Blake, and their child.
124. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 20, at 1949.
125. See id. For a comprehensive overview and critique of diminishingmarginal-utility arguments, see Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining
Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011).
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Imagine that with an extra $100, Addison and Blake would buy an
Amazon Echo smart speaker that three people—Adison, Blake, and
their child—would use. By contrast, an extra $100 in Shirley’s hands
would go toward the purchase of goods or services that benefit only
two people. Even if Addison, Blake, and their child are materially
better off than Shirley and her child, an extra $100 for Addison and
Blake may do more to improve total utility because Addison and
Blake can leverage economies of scale in household consumption.126
The utilitarian thus arrives at something of an impasse. Perhaps
we can increase total utility by providing larger demogrants to single
parents than to married parents because single parents are
materially worse off in ways the linear income tax has not yet
accounted for; perhaps we can increase total utility by providing
larger demogrants to married parents than to single parents because
married parents can leverage scale economies in household
consumption more effectively than single parents can. If we cannot
accurately estimate the relative magnitude of these effects, perhaps
we should throw up our hands and leave the tax structure as is,
without adjusting either way for single parent status (and thus
without distorting marriage decisions).
This impasse is more easily escapable for readers of some
philosophical persuasions than for others. The scale-economy
differences that complicate the analysis for utilitarians who posit a
Benthamite social welfare function (i.e., “maximize the sum of
individual welfares”) are less problematic for those who characterize
the social welfare function in Rawlsian terms (i.e., “maximize the
welfare level of the worst off person”).127 Addison and Blake
presumably would concede that Shirley is materially worse off than
they are, even if Shirley’s relative position does not necessarily
translate into a higher marginal utility of income. Redistribution

126. See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Distribution and the Family, 98
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 75, 90 (1996) (observing that the marginal utility of
consumption is not necessarily declining over household size because larger
households can leverage economies of scale in household consumption).
127. Amartya Sen, Rawls Versus Bentham: An Axiomatic Examination of the
Pure Distribution Problem, 4 THEORY & DECISION 301, 302 (1974); see also JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 132–35 (rev. ed. 1999). On the application of
Rawlsian theory to tax policy, see Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice
and Limitations of Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004). Notably, Rawls’s theory of justice applies only to
the “basic structure of society.” See RAWLS, supra, at 3. Possibly a better way of
characterizing the intuition that society should redistribute to the less well-off
even when the less well-off do not have the highest marginal utility of income
would be to use the language of “prioritarianism” associated with Derek Parfit.
See Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, in DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 115, (2003); Douglas Bamford, Ethical Taxation: Progressivity,
Efficiency and Hourly Averaging, in PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS OF JUSTICE
AND TAXATION 135, 140–41 (Helmut P. Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger &
Clemens Sedmak eds., 2015).
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toward single parents would thus seem congenial to Rawlsians, even
if it is more questionable for Benthamite utilitarians.
More explicitly egalitarian theories of tax justice also can support
a single parent bonus. Consider Elizabeth Anderson’s argument that
“a just society must assure to all citizens effective access to the social
bases of equal standing,” which “requires that all citizens have
effective access to the means they need to escape oppressive
relationships . . . and to fully participate as equals in the political,
economic, and social life of the community.”128
Anderson
acknowledges that some people (e.g., those who suffer from
disabilities) require additional resources to participate in society as
equal citizens, and additional transfers to those individuals are, in
her view, therefore warranted.129 Single parents might be in a
similar, though perhaps less permanent, position: to pursue an
education, advance in the workplace, and participate fully in the civic
life of their communities, single parents often require resources that
married couples do not (e.g., evening child care). A credit for single
parents could be justified on that basis even if we are uncertain that
their marginal utility of income is higher than that of married
couples.
But single parent subsidies raise another obvious concern: single
parent bonuses necessarily entail marriage penalties, and marriage
penalties will likely lead to lower marriage rates. New research by
Edward Fox indicates that marriage incentives embedded in the
Revenue Act of 1948 had significant effects on marriage
probabilities.130
Earlier research exploiting various marriage
penalties and bonuses generated by income taxes and means-tested
transfers generally suggests that tax and transfer factors have a
modest but measurable effect on marriage decisions.131 Meanwhile,
ample evidence indicates that married couples are happier than
single individuals132 and that children raised by married couples
achieve better educational and employment outcomes than children

128. Elizabeth Anderson, Welfare, Work Requirements, and Dependent-Care,
21 J. APPLIED PHIL. 243, 251 (2004).
129. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, A Basic Income for All: Optional Freedoms,
BOS. REV., Oct. 1, 2000, at 1–2.
130. See Edward G. Fox, Do Taxes Affect Marriage? Lessons from History 42–
43 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Of Law, NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17–15, 2017).
131. For an updated literature review, see id. at 13–14 & n.24–27. For earlier
reviews, see James Alm et al., Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty, 13 J. ECON.
PERSP. 193 (1999); Nancy Burstein, Economic Influences On Marriage And
Divorce, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 387 (2007).
132. See, e.g., Shawn Grover & John F. Helliwell, How’s Life at Home? New
Evidence on Marriage and the Set Point for Happiness, 20 J. HAPPINESS STUD.
373, 384–85 (2018).
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raised by single parents.133 If marriage has profoundly positive
effects on spouses and children, then policies that disincentivize
marriage in order to improve distribution may unintentionally leave
their beneficiaries worse off.
There are, however, at least two reasons to question whether
marriage penalties should be a significant cause for concern. First,
and most familiarly, claims about the effects of marriage on spousal
and child wellbeing run the risk of conflating correlation with
causation. Once controls for household income and various measures
of parenting behavior are added in a multiple regression analysis,
much of marriage’s effect on child outcomes disappears.134 Granted,
marriage may contribute to a couple’s income-earning ability and may
allow married individuals to invest more time, energy, and resources
in their children—in which case controlling for household income and
parenting behavior could mask marriage’s full positive effect. Still,
the point remains that causal claims about marriage that are based
on observational data should be viewed with healthy skepticism.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, in assessing the
implications of relatively modest marriage penalties, the relevant
question is not whether marriage makes couples and their children
better off; the question is whether marginal marriages improve the
welfare of couples and their offspring. By marginal marriages, I refer
to marriages that would be deterred by a modest marriage penalty
(or, conversely, marriages that could be incentivized by a modest
marriage bonus). Imagine, for example, that we increase the
demogrant for single parents by $500. The result will be a $1000
marriage penalty if two single parents wed. To a first approximation,
this policy will deter marriage when and only when the perceived
benefits of marriage to the couple are less than $1000 per year. It is
these marginal marriages that a modest single parent bonus would
potentially deter.
What are the effects of marginal marriages on spouses and their
children? One of the most interesting studies on the subject examines
an Austrian policy that provided large cash grants to first-time
newlyweds from the early 1970s until 1987.135 In August 1987, the
Austrian government announced that it would end the policy effective
January 1 of the following year, setting off a marriage boom in late
1987.136 Wolfgang Frimmel and coauthors examined couples who wed
during the marriage boom and who were eligible for the subsidy
133. See Kimberly Howard & Richard V. Reeves, The Marriage Effect: Money
or
Parenting?
BROOKINGS
(Sept.
4,
2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-marriage-effect-money-or-parenting.
134. See id.; Richard V. Reeves & Kimberly Howard, The Parenting Gap,
BROOKINGS
(Sept.
28,
2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/09-parenting-gap-social-mobility-wellbeing-reeves.pdf.
135. See Wolfgang Frimmel et al., Can Pro-Marriage Policies Work? An
Analysis of Marginal Marriages, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 1357, 1359 (2014).
136. Id. at 1359.
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(“marginal marriages”), comparing those couples to a control group of
subsidy-ineligible couples and couples who married before or well
after the government’s announcement.137 They found that the
marginal marriages were not more likely to result in divorce, but
marginal marriages did result in fewer children and—more
disturbingly—children who were less healthy at birth (measured by
birthweight) than children born to control-group marriages.138 In
other words, marginal marriages may differ from inframarginal
marriages in welfare-relevant ways.
Studies that use temporary marriage incentives to measure the
effects of marginal marriages on spouses and children are rare. A
second line of research examines policy interventions that change the
cost of de-marriage (i.e., divorce). In the second half of the twentieth
century, most states adopted laws that allow “unilateral” divorce
(allowing a spouse to initiate a divorce without proving the other
spouse’s “fault” or obtaining the other spouse’s consent).139 One might
think of these laws as reducing the transaction costs of divorce,
making it somewhat easier for spouses to exit a marriage. To be sure,
divorce is possible even under a fault-based regime: New York, for
example, did not allow unilateral divorce until 2010,140 and divorce
was not unheard-of in New York before then. The effect of unilateral
divorce laws on the divorce rate appears to be small: Justin Wolfers
estimates a one-half percentage point increase in the probability that
a couple will divorce over the course of the first decade of marriage,141
while a later study suggests that Wolfers’s estimate is—if anything—
too high.142 Thus, the adoption of a unilateral divorce law is a
plausible candidate for a natural experiment to test the effect of
marginal marriages on welfare-relevant outcomes.
The results are mixed. A 2004 study by Jonathan Gruber
examined children who were exposed to unilateral divorce laws (i.e.,
who grew up in states that allowed unilateral divorce).143 He finds
that exposure to unilateral divorce laws is associated with a lower
probability of graduating from high school and college, a decline in
employment and income as an adult, and a rise in subsequent suicide
137. Id. at 1358.
138. Id. at 1359
139. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q. J. ECON. 267, 273 (2006); Denese
Ashbaugh Vlosky & Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of No-Fault Divorce
Laws in the 50 States, 51 FAM. REL. 317, 317 (2002).
140. Paterson Signs No-Fault Divorce Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/nyregion/16divorce.html.
141. Justin Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A
Reconciliation and New Results, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1802, 1818 (2006).
142. See Jin Young Lee & Gary Solon, The Fragility of Estimated Effects of
Unilateral Divorce Laws on Divorce Rates, 11 B.E. J. ECON. ANAL. & POL’Y, no. 1,
2011, at 4.
143. Jonathan Gruber, Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The LongRun Implications of Unilateral Divorce, 22 J. LAB. ECON. 799, 799 (2004).
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rates.144 Gruber interprets his results as suggesting a “qualified yes”
answer to the question: “Does making divorce easier have negative
long-run implications for children?”145 There are, however, at least
two reasons to hesitate before concluding that pro-marriage policies
are therefore warranted. First, the causal effect of divorce on children
is not necessarily the mirror-image of the causal effect of marriage on
children. It may be that the welfare effects of growing up with
divorced parents are more negative than the welfare effects of
growing up with never-married parents. In that case, policies that
encourage marriage may have perverse effects on children because
without marriage there is—of course—no possibility of divorce.
Second, another of Gruber’s findings is that children who are exposed
to unilateral divorce laws are significantly more likely to get
married—and to get married earlier.146 The causal mechanism is
unclear, but one possibility is that exposure to unilateral divorce laws
reduces the perceived cost of marriage, as it makes exit appear easier.
In any event, the positive correlation between exposure to unilateral
divorce laws as a child and marriage as an adult suggests that some
of the negative outcomes of parental divorce may in fact be
attributable to one’s own marriage.
A later study by Betsey Stevenson and Wolfers paints a more
positive picture of universal divorce laws (and a correspondingly
darker picture of marriage).147 Stevenson and Wolfers focus on the
effect of universal divorce laws on adults, and they find that adoption
of those laws is associated with an 8 to 16 percent decline in female
suicide, a roughly 30 percent decline in domestic violence, and a 10
percent decline in the number of women murdered by their
partners.148 These results indicate that marginal marriages—those
that would end in states with unilateral divorce laws but persist
elsewhere—are in fact rather dangerous to their members, suggesting
that pro-marriage policies are potentially quite destructive.
But it is premature to jump to concrete conclusions about the
welfare effects of marginal marriages based on studies of unilateral
divorce. The broader point is that inframarginal marriages and
marginal marriages may have very different consequences, and it is
the latter that are most likely to be affected by relatively modest
marriage penalties. If the marginal marriages that would be deterred
by a tax penalty are the marriages especially likely to result in
domestic abuse (or worse), then a marriage penalty could actually
improve welfare, even if marriage generally has a positive effect on
welfare.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 815–17, 822.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 815–19.
See Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 137.
Id. at 267, 277, 281, 284.
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Against this background of uncertainty, policy recommendations
are necessarily tentative. If one believes that transferring resources
to single parents yields distributional benefits (whether or not these
are distributional benefits that a Benthamite social welfare function
would recognize) and that marriage decisions are generally rational,
then the appropriate prescription might be to increase the demogrant
for single parents up to the point that the distributional benefit
equals the efficiency loss from distorting marriage choices. Assuming
that marriage decisions are made rationally, the efficiency loss from
a marginal increase in the size of the single parent bonus is simply
equal to the number of additional marriages deterred multiplied by
the associated tax penalty. The deadweight loss from the distortion
therefore increases geometrically over the size of the bonus or
penalty. A relatively small transfer of resources to single parents
may be justified on distributional grounds, but as the transfer grows
larger, the corresponding distortion becomes more acute.
In any event, what should be clear by now is that the challenge
of determining the size of the optimal transfer to single parents is
quite distinct from the marriage tax trilemma. We can achieve
marriage neutrality while maintaining progressivity and couples
neutrality, but that does not mean we should. Whether to deviate
from marriage neutrality in the direction of a single parent bonus
depends upon (a) the distributional benefits of further assistance to
single parents and (b) the distortion (which may in fact be a welfare
improvement) from deterring marginal marriages.
These are
difficult—and important—questions. Tax law academia would do
better to reallocate some of its collective brainpower from a soluble
marriage tax trilemma to these matters.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
So far, I have argued that the marriage tax trilemma is not a
trilemma at all: not only is it soluble, but even if we solved it, we still
would likely want to break two of its three legs. That argument yields
implications for research, policy, and pedagogy. This final Part
considers those implications.
A.

Implications for Research

The thought experiment of a flat tax with a demogrant refocuses
our attention toward new normative and empirical questions and
casts old questions in a new light. On a normative note, the thought
experiment calls on us to consider the virtues—if any—of formal
equality on the basis of marital status and household composition in
tax law. At the same time, the thought experiment underscores the
real-world empirical uncertainties whose resolution ought to shape
tax policy toward marriage.
First, a flat tax with a demogrant would allow us to achieve
progressivity without distinguishing among individuals on the basis
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of marital status or household composition.149 Simply moving to
mandatory single filing in a graduated rate system does not
necessarily accomplish that result, because couples would then have
incentives to shift income and assets to the lower-bracket member.150
A country conceivably could do nothing to police those transfers, but
the effect would then be to allow income-splitting for couples, which
would result in a de facto couples bonus (though not one technically
tied to marriage)151. For that reason, countries with single filing
systems, such as Canada, still maintain marriage-sensitive tax rules
in order to guard against the avoidance opportunities that a tax
system blind to marital status and household composition would
create.152
A flat tax with a demogrant would solve these problems, because
there are no tax advantages to shifting income and assets when
everyone faces the same marginal rate. Such a system would likely
reduce administrative and compliance costs, as it would obviate the
need for sometimes-complicated rules and standards that are
designed to guard against marginal rate arbitrage (e.g., the
assignment of income doctrine,153 the kiddie tax,154 and many of the
rules regarding the taxation of irrevocable trusts155). Perhaps most
interestingly, it would allow for a tax system that is truly neutral with
respect to marital and living arrangements.
I have argued above that the marriage neutrality norm in tax law
carries little obvious value when lots of other areas of law distinguish
on the basis of marital status.156 But perhaps that conclusion is too
glib. If we extend the time horizon of political possibility and imagine
a world in which marital distinctions in other areas of law might be
abolished, would we want to use marital status as a factor in tax and
transfer decisions? Recall that the policies I have proposed are a
reduced rate for secondary earners and a bonus for single parents—
the first of which is the opposite of the current tax law’s privileging of
married couples in which one spouse earns much more than the other.
The thought experiment calls on us to ask whether objections to
couples and marriage non-neutrality are objections to the direction of
the non-neutrality or to the law’s reliance on marriage.

149. See supra Part I.
150. See Lisa Philipps, Income Splitting and Gender Equality: The Case for
Incentivizing Intra-Household Wealth Transfers 7–8 (Comparative Research in
Law & Political Economy, CLPE Research Paper 04/2010, 2010).
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id. at 3–4.
153. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930).
154. See I.R.C. § 1(g) (2012).
155. See id. §§ 641–85.
156. See supra Part V.
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The question of whether the law should recognize marriage at all
is, of course, not a new one.157 The question takes on additional
elements in the tax context. If we want to impose a lower rate on
secondary earners and want to transfer resources to single parents,
we could use cohabitation rather than marriage as a proxy. We could,
for example, define a “secondary earner” as a person who shares a
principal residence for 183 days of the year or more with another
adult who earns a higher income. We could likewise define a “single
parent” as a person who can claim a child below a certain age as a
dependent and who does not share a principal residence with another
adult between 18 and 65. We might be concerned about the
distortions that such definitions would create (e.g., how many spouses
would choose for tax reasons to spend their days together and then
for one of them to sleep overnight at a nearby motel?), but setting
aside the efficiency implications, are there meaningful harms—
expressive or otherwise—when the law distinguishes among
individuals on the basis of their coupling decisions?
In my view, any objections to distinguishing on the basis of
household composition are not sufficiently serious to outweigh the
efficiency gains from a lower rate on secondary earners and the
distributive benefits from a bonus for single parents. I anticipate that
others may think otherwise. My primary goal here is not to convince
others of my position but to clarify the stakes of the normative debate:
Do those who argue for marriage neutrality object to the particular
non-neutralities observed in the current tax code, or to the idea of
distinguishing among taxpayers on the basis of marital status more
broadly, or to any legal distinction that hinges on the decision to
cohabitate? Once we move beyond the trilemma framing, these are
the sorts of normative questions that we can better understand.
For empiricists, the reframing of the marriage tax problem
directs attention to at least two discrete questions. First, the
elasticity of taxable income for primary and secondary earners turns
out to be a critically important input in the design of the optimal tax
regime for couples. Note that the elasticity of taxable income is a
different statistic than the price elasticity of labor supply, which is
the statistic upon which most existing empirical studies focus.158 It
is the former and not the latter that serves as a sufficient statistic for
the excess burden of marginal income tax changes. We care not only
about the effect of taxes on hours worked, but also about the marginal
product of that labor. For example, a higher tax rate on primary
earners may cause some primary earners to continue to work the
same number of hours but to switch to a job with a lower salary and
157. See MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 2–3 (Anita
Bernstein ed., 2006) (for a range of perspectives).
158. Robert McClelland & Shannon Mok, A Review of Recent Research on
Labor Supply Elasticities 9–10 (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 201212, 2012).
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higher untaxed fringe benefits—the sort of switch that we might
overlook if we examine only the price elasticity of labor supply.159
Refocusing empirical analysis on the elasticity of taxable income for
primary and secondary earners rather than the price elasticity of
labor supply would make the results more useful to the development
of policy.
Second, the discussion above illustrates that in evaluating the
welfare effects of marriage non-neutrality, we need to know not only
whether (and how much) tax affects marital choices, but also whether
(and how much) marginal marriages affect the welfare of spouses and
children. The empirical literature on the former question is
voluminous;160 the literature on the latter question—canvassed
above—is scant.161 Without knowing even the sign of the welfare
effect of marginal marriages, it is impossible to draw concrete
conclusions as to whether the marriage disincentives embedded in a
single parent bonus are worrisome. Identifying marginal marriages
is, to be sure, difficult, but until we can make more progress on this
front, claims about the optimal tax treatment of marriage will
necessarily be tentative.
B.

Implications for Policy

With that last-mentioned point at front of mind, I should
emphasize that the policy implications derived from the analysis
above are provisional. The first recommendation, appropriately
caveated, is to lower the tax rate on secondary earners relative to
primary earners until the efficiency gain from secondary earners
increasing their taxable income equals the efficiency loss from
primary earners reducing theirs. The second recommendation is to
allow for a single parent bonus even though (and perhaps especially
because) such a bonus implies a penalty that will deter marginal
marriages. The first change would indeed be a change—but also a
return to the policy briefly implemented in the early 1980s.162 The
second suggestion is, in fact, reasonably close to the status quo, muchmaligned though marriage penalties for single parents are today.163
The analysis above might also suggest that the design of child
care subsidies should occupy a more central role in policy discussions
regarding the tax treatment of marriage. Child care subsidies may
operate as functional substitutes for tax cuts targeting secondary

159. Id. at 4.
160. See supra note 129.
161. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
162. Gann, supra note 101, at 476.
163. Jacob Goldin & Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of Household: Rethinking
the Taxation of Single Parents, 71 TAX L. REV. 367, 369 (2018) (pointing out that
the tilting of single parent bonuses toward upper-income single parents is one
genuinely difficult-to-defend feature of the current tax code).
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earners.164 Both interventions increase the after-tax return to a
secondary earner’s participation in the market economy, at least
where the secondary earner is also a parent. Child care subsidies may
also provide alternative means of achieving the goals of a single
parent bonus: by subsidizing child care, we enhance the ability of
single parents to participate as equals in the political, economic, and
social life of the community. The optimal design of child care
subsidies is a multifaceted question that lies beyond this Essay’s
scope. Yet in thinking about how to achieve the objectives of (a)
encouraging secondary earner participation in the market economy
and (b) assisting single parents, we ought not limit our analysis to
traditional tax tools.
C.

Implications for Pedagogy

Ultimately, the clearest implication of the preceding analysis is
pedagogical. The marriage tax trilemma may play an important role
in the intellectual history of U.S. tax law scholarship, but as a
framework for thinking about the tax treatment of married couples in
introductory courses on income taxation and upper level seminars on
tax policy, the trilemma is largely a distraction. It is a problem we
know how to solve, but if we were to solve it, we would likely conclude
that couples neutrality is not a desirable goal and marriage neutrality
might not be either. The modest proposal offered here is that instead
of focusing on a problem for which we know the solution, we should
shift our attention to questions whose answers do not yet lie within
our grasp.
One potential exercise is to begin the unit on the tax treatment
of marriage by asking students for their reactions to a hypothetical
policy that provides a bonus of roughly $650 per year to single parents
working full time at the minimum wage, relative to the tax they would
pay if they earned that amount as part of a two parent equal earner
couple. This is, in approximate terms, a description of current law.165
My prediction, based on my own experience, is that at large chunk of
the class will support the policy on the grounds that it helps to offset
the financial burden of raising a child alone. Next, ask students for
their reactions to a policy that imposes a tax penalty of roughly $1300
per year on single parents earning the minimum wage who marry.
The policy, framed in those terms, attracts few defenders. Some will
see (and the reader by now will be well aware) that these are in fact
164. Understanding Child Care Subsidies in the Tax System: Hearing Before
the H. Democratic Women’s Working Grp., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of
Elaine Maag, Senior Research Associate, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center).
165. See Minimum Wage, STATE OF CAL., DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS (Dec.
2016), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_minimumwage.htm (stating that the
minimum wage for large employers in the most populous state, California, is $12
per hour starting January 1, 2019—an individual working 40 hours per week for
50 weeks at $12 per hour would earn $24,000); see also supra Table 6.
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two descriptions of the same policy. Unlike the marriage tax
trilemma, the duality of single parent bonuses and marriage penalties
is in fact one that “[n]o algebraic equation, no matter how
sophisticated,” can crack.166
Pedagogy and policy are of course intertwined. Students’
intuitions—unadulterated (yet) by the trilemma framing—provide us
with useful data on how much normative significance non-tax lawyers
attach to couples neutrality and marriage neutrality, and how much
resistance policies that intentionally violate those norms will
engender. Class discussions also can be generative of new policy ideas
and new perspectives on old ones. And students will go on to be tax
policymakers—in some cases as government officials, in most cases
as voters.167 Studying and teaching the taxation of marriage through
the lens of the trilemma sacrifices valuable opportunities to engage
in potentially productive debates about the real normative and
empirical questions that tax policy toward marriage must struggle to
resolve.

166. See Cohen Testimony, supra note 6, at 79.
167. See, e.g., David Grande, David A. Asch & Katrina Armstrong, Do Doctors
Vote?, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 585, 585–86 (2007) (noting high rate of voting
among lawyers).
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